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D. K. Osborne*
1. Introduction
The long controversy over this subject is dying without issue.
The annals of the subject having no declared winner to show for all the
tedium and confusion, affirmers, deniers, and agnostics mainly go their
separate ways convinced that the others are blind. Yet the very persistence
of the affirmers is giving them their way. The rest are so tired of
denying or demurring to no effect that they surrender in practice if not
in theory. The following ritual occurs daily in seminar rooms through-
out the English-speaking world (at least): Jones presents an analysis,
of some social ~uestion or other, that depends in an essential way on
interpersonal comparisons. Smith, no affirmer, mildly points out the
dependence. Jones, knowing that the new ground rules protect these
comparisons once they are acknowledged, cooly admits them. Jones and
Smith, having thus duly observed good form, proceed to discuss the remaining
assumptions, the method of analysis, the accuracy of the data, and the
results as if they had left 00 great ~uestion dangling.
*Department of Research, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas. I
am grateful for the criticisms given to a previous draft of this paper
at the 1977 meeting of the Public Choice Society.2
But it is clear that the body of analysis and putative principles
that lately constitute our normative theory of economic policy--in other
words, modern political economy--lives or dies with interpersonal com-
parisons. This is the political economy of broad utilitarianism, that is,
of social utility together with the stipulation that social utility in-
creases in some manner with individual utility. This political economy
aims, therefore, to maximize some increasing function (not necessarily
the sum) of individual utilities. Such a function can satisfy Arrow-
like conditions, thus imparting some minimal content to the concept of
social utility, only if the utilities of different persons are comparable.*
The same necessity underlies all the familiar devices, such as com-
pensation schemes, cost/benefit ratios, or consumers' surplus**, that
purport to reveal the social utility or its changes, and all such familiar
arguments as unemployment, income distribution, or gross national product
that often stand in for individual utilities. All calculations with
such things ultimately rest on interpersonal comparisons (the rare Pareto-
dominant case aside).
These necessities are admitted, at least implicitly, by those
who stubbornly affirm interpersonal comparisons in order to "save political
economy," as if the modern systemwere the only one to value individual
*See Osborne (1976, esp. pp. 1010, 1011).
**A single consumer's surplus might in some cases vary mono-
tonically with his utility. This possibility, beyond our present concern,
is not sufficient for interpersonal comparisons via consumers' surplus
(with the apostrophe after the s).3
concerns. But a political economy can value individual freedom instead
of individual preference. Classical liberalism, for instance, aims (in
Kant's words) at' "a constitution that achieves the greatest possible
freedom of human individuals by framing the laws in such a way that the
freedom of each can co-exist with that of all others." (Critique of
Pure Reason, p. 373.) And it is clear that questions of freedom need
not determine a person's preference; he might be freer in state x than
state y but prefer y to x on grounds of security. Classical liberalism,
then, does not even reach the question of interpersonal comparisons, thus
showing that a healthy fear of the collectivist systems, where "society"
or the state is supreme, by no means commits us interpersonal comparisons.
No more does a distaste for the status quo so commit us. Many, believing
that all social change inevitably violates somebody's preferences, go on
to declare that the comparisons are needed to justify the change. We
may grant the belief, but the declaration presupposes a political economy
concerned only with preferences. I can see nothing more than habit and
the power of suggestion in this presupposition. The status quo of our
time is probably no closer to Kant's aim than the status quo of his,
at least in the United States.
The long debate between classical liberalism and broad utilitarianism
does not, of course, turn only on interpersonal comparisons.* If these com-
parisons were possible, thus making possible a respectable utilitarian
political economy, they would not for that reason imply its superiority.
*See Osborne (1978).4
We would still have to choose between freedom and utility as the ultimate
criterion for economic policy. But if the comparisons are impossible--
all putative instances of them being meaningless expressions or confusions
of thought--then modern political economy has a vacuum where its principles
should be. Politics abhors a vacuum equally with nature, and must fill it
with its own principles. The principles of coalition and power explain
our actual economic policy, which talks in theory of the public interest
while in practice facilitating the mutual coercion of factions. This
situation, which few of us like, might not demonstrate our political
ignorance or stupidity or ill will so much as our complete and un-
conscious allegiance to a logically impossible doctrine. Power and coercion
easily dress up as the public interest where the formulas claiming to
measure it are empty.
These considerations justify a careful account. A complete account
being out of the question because of length, I will aim only at the worst and
commonest confusions in the subject. These I take to concern compensation
schemes, the ordinal/cardinal question, the question of common units or
origins of utility scales, and the notion that we compare peoples' utilities
in everyday life.* Some simple formal machinery will help all but the last,
which I therefore take up prior to the machinery.
*For the fallacy in the just-noticeable difference approach to
interpersonal comparisons, as advanced by Goodman and Markowitz (1952), see
Luch and Raiffa (1957, p. 347). This and a few other exceptions aside, I
see no purpose in citing the sources or perpetuators of the confusions.5
The controversy owes something to differences in usage. As we
will use the term, an interpersonal comparison is an expression of the
form OC or IC:
OC (ordinal comparison): Individual 1 likes x more
than individual 2 likes y (or alternatively,
1 is better off at x than 2 is at y).
IC (interval comparison): Individual l's preference for
w over x exceeds individual 2's preference for y
over z (or, alternatively, 1 gains more from the
movement from x to w than 2 does from a movement
from z to y).
Here, w, x, y, and z belong to the 'set of social states over
which the individuals have preference orderings. In OC, alternatives
x and y mayor may not be distinct. In IC, w and x are distinct and
y and z are distinct but no further distinctions need obtain. Thus
IC can be interpreted, if appropriate, as "the move from w to x benefits
1 more than it harms 2."
By this usage, an interpersonal comparison expresses a putative
fact, not a value, and must be judged accordingly. It is the most common
usage but not the only one to be found in the literature, where inter-
personal comparisons are often regarded as value judgments. Graaff (1957,
p. 167), for instance, uses "interpersonal comparisons" in the sense
illustrated by "x is better than y because it benefits the worthier 1."6
This is indeed a value judgment but it is an interpersonal evaluation:
it compares the merits of two persons, not the utilities of states to
them. Aild Robbins (1949., pp. 138-141), though using theterm ill the
sense of expression ae, regards it as a value judgment on the ground
that ae is not testable--thus implicitly equating the class of value
jUdgments with the class of untestable expressions. In our terms,
neither ae nor Ie is a value judgment.
2• "We Do It Every Day"
Probably nothing more frequently appears in defense of theoretical
appeals to interpersonal comparisons than the assertion, that for all the
difficulties these comparisons raise in principle they are nonetheless
possible in practice, as shown by our frequent recourse to them in daily
living. It is said, for example, that when we give Jones a book and Smith
a recording we implicitly compare their utilities: Jones likes the book
more than Smith does, Smith likes the recording more than Jones does.
Again, when we have a spare ballet ticket, for instance, and give it to
Jones instead of Smith, we imply that Jones likes the ballet more than
Smith does. For after all, if we want to give to the person who will
derive the most pleasure, our very decision entails an interpersonal
comparison.The implication is clear: Since our practice shows (it is said)
that the difficulties are strictly theoretical, we can leave theoretical
niceties to the future while we get on with the more urgent matters. It
is as if the affirmers were the Wright brothers and the deniers those
orthodox physicists who continued to prove the impossibility of flying
machines right up to 1905. A dollar for every denier silenced by this
reasoning would make us rich.*
The reasoning, however, which descends from Little (1957) through
Spence (1973, 1977) and others, turns on a mere figure of speech. When
we say that Jones likes the book more and the recording less than Smith,
we appear to utter two interpersonal comparisons. They are strictly
figurative. Behind them stand two real intrapersonal comparisons:
Jones prefers the book to the recording, Smith the reverse. That is all
we need to know in order to give wisely.
It is the same with respect to the ballet ticket. A figurative
comparison, setting Jones's taste for the ballet against Smith's, masks
the real comparisons that we must make concerning each person's taste for
the ballet relative to other things. Jones greatly enjoys the ballet
and Smith does not; i.e., relative to other things that we might give,
the ballet stands high in Jones's preference ordering but not so high
in Smith's. Over a period of time we try, by a roughly balanced sequence
of gifts to both men, to reach the highest feasible place in the preference
ordering of each one. For this we need to know something about each man's
preferences and nothing else. We migbt well describe our action as
"giving to the person who enjoys it most," but only as a common manner
of speaking.
*Agnostics, on the other hand, often seem to view an interpersonal
comparison less as something impossible than as something to be avoided, as if
it were fattening.8
Similar expressions occur in other contexts. We might say of a
man, that he is more intelligent than virtuous. But we understand this
to mean that he ranks higher among his fellows in intelligence than in
virtue. We realize, when we think about it, that the comparison between
intelligence and virtue is only a figurative stand-in for two real com-
parisons of men. No one would consider it a proof that intelligence and
virtue, despite what the philosophers say, are really comparable. In
familiar contexts, we can still distinguish between arguments and
figures of speech. For our confusions in political economy we have to
blame its completely theoretical nature, its complete disjunction from
our daily lives.
3. Machinery
Let X be the set of alternatives, N the set of individuals, and
S the cartesian product NxX. S contains pairs such as (i,x), the first
element of which is a person and the second is an alternative. Let(";",
\.=J
be a binary relation on S with at least some of the properties of a weak
ordering--e.g., transitivity--andG be its antisymmetric part. The




No~ form the cartesian product of X with itself, eliminate the
diagonal, and premultiply the result by N to obtain the set T of triples
(i,x,y) such that xiy. Let > 'be a binary relation on T, with antisymmetric
~'-
part > i, such that it also has at least some of the properties of an __,




In these terms, the question is whether the assumed relations are well-defined,
have observable consequences, and capture the intuitive notions expressed by
OC and IC.
Two axioms seem essential.
Ax. 1: @ and0 are preorders, i.e., whether surrounded by
a circle or a square, > is transitive and reflexive
while > is transitive, irreflexive, and antisymmetric.
This axiom imposes a connection between the comparisons concerning different
pairs of individuals, different pairs or quadruples of states, or both.
Thus if (i,u,v)I~I(j ,w,x) and (j ,w,x)~(k,y,z), then (i,u,v)Q (k,y,z).
For the second axiom, letf';\. be individual ifs preference
\;;:) J.
ordering (x@ i Y iff i weakly prefers x to y, x8 i Y iff he prefers
x to y, x0 i Y iff he is indifferent between them) and' ~I i be the
individual's intensive preference ordering (e.g., (w,xl!>l. (y,z) iff i
L:..J~
prefers w to x more than he prefers y to z).
Ax. 2: For all ieN and all w,x,y,zeX such that w,Ox and yi:oz:
(i,x) 8(i,y) iff x@i y;
(i,w,x)0(i,y,Z) iff (w,xli ~Ii (y,z).10
This axiom imposes a connection between interpersonal comparisons
and individual preferences.*
Besides these axioms, we must also require'r:; andl..:-J to be
well defined. This requirement inheres in the very notion of a meaningful
relation.**
4. COmpensation Schemes
Actually, the only surviving compensation scheme is Scitovsky's
(1941). Scitovsky advanced this scheme, based on the "double bribery"






in terms of individual
i's welfare as understood by the paternalist rather than the individual.
Then Axiom 2 connects interpersonal comparisons with individual welfare
as understood by paternalistic observers. On either interpretation, a
third essential axiom would impose a continuity on the ordering so that
Axiom 2 could not be realized by a trivial definition. This, however, does
not figure in our discussion.
**Let a relation R on set {a,b,c,..•} be determined by another
relation Q on set {a,B,y•..l, that is, aRb if'f aQB, and let a,B,Y..• belong
to equivalence classes [a], [B], [y],••. as determined by some equivalence
relation. Then R is well-defined whenever it is preserved by substitutions
within equiValence classes: aRb iff a'QB' for all a'e[a], B'e[B].11
it is also advanced, in informal discussions at least, as a way of comparing
utilities, and that is how we will treat it. The results apply to both of
its putative uses.
Consider the particular comparison between (l,w,x) and (2,x,w),
where 1 prefers w to x and 2 prefers x to w. For any alternative ZEX and
persons h,kEN, let zt
hk denote the state derived from Z by transferring
some designated commodity from h to k. Then the ScitoV'sky criterion would
imply (l,w,x) r:-l(2,x,W) if whenever there is a transfer from 1 to 2 such
that
(i = 1,2),
there is ~ transfer from 2 to 1 such that
(i = 1,2),
where strict inequality holds at least once in each of (i) and (ii). In
other words, 1 prefers w to x more strongly than 2 prefers x to w if he can
bribe 2 to accept w but 2 cannot bribe him to accept x. The second part
is essential to the antisymmetry
~ of' > i
L'
for, as Scitovsky showed, in
some cases 1 and 2 could bribe each other for their preferred states.
r---'
Without the second part of this criterion we could have both (l,w,x)~
(2,x,w) and the reV'erse. The second part is designed to prevent this,
thOUgh at the cost of leaving unrelated the elements of T for which
reciprocal bribery is possible. Thus the Scitovsky criterion only· ..:,.
12
partially orders T, but that is all right if it orders transitively.
The Scitovsky criterion in fact violates transitivity. To see
this, suppose
(a) ( . ,.----,
1.,W,x) i > i
~
~
(j,x,w) and (j,x,w) i >; (k,w,x).,
~
i.e., i can bribe j and j cannot bribe i, but j can bribe k while k cannot
bribe j. Clearly, (a) is consistent with the further supposition that
(b) (k,W,X)! > I(h,x,w) and (h,x,w)i > ,(i,w,x),
for the bribing powers of i,j, and k imply nothing about those of h. In
other words, there is no reason to doubt that (a) and (b) can simultaneously
meet the Scitovsky criterion. However, (a) and (b) have inconsistent
implications. By transitivity, (a) implies (i,w,x)! > I(k,w,x) while
(b) implies the reverse. Hence Scitovsky's scheme--the only surviving
compensation scheme--violates Axiom 1.
5. The Connection With Utility Measurement
In view of Axiom 2, expression IC is meaningless unless the
individuals concerned have intensive preferences, i.e., unless they can
say whether their preference for one alternative over another exceeds their
preference for some other alternative over yet another one. The existence
of such intensity in the preferences does not imply their intensive ("cardinal")
...,..----,
measurement; for this, the intensive orderingsI ::. Ii must satisfy several
restrictive conditions, as given, for instance, by Krantz, Luces, Suppes,13
and Tversky (1971). However, the intensity in the preferences is necessary
for their intensive measurement.
In short, intensive preferences are necessary for the meaningful-
ness of expression IC and for the existence of cardinal utility functions.
This is the entire connection between utility measurement and interval
interpersonal comparisons. Such measurement and such comparisons imply
intensive preferences. That is all. Neither implies the other. The next
three sections aim to demonstrate this statement.
6. Comparison Normally Precedes Measurement
To believe that utility measurement somehow permits or induces
interpersonal comparisons is to put the cart before the horse. Measure-
ment is the assignment of numbers to empirical objects or events in such
a way that to every empirical relation describing the property being
measured there corresponds a formally equivalent relation between the
numbers. The empirical relations come first, the numbers and numerical
relations afterward.
Measurement, of any kind, takes as given a set of empirical
objects or events together with certain empirical relations between them
and, in some cases, one or more empirical operations that can be performed
on them. This set, together with the relations and operations, constitutes
an empirical relational structure (e.r.s.). The measurement theory of some
property begins by imposing conditions on this structure that make the
property measureable. It continues with the selection of a set of numbers14
together with mathematical relations and operations that will mimic the
e.r.s.--i.e., it selects a numerical relational structure (n.r.s.). It
then constructs a homomorphism between the e.r.s. and the n.r.s.' This
homomorphism is a scale.
'>"''''--" For a simple example, let Y be a set of steel rods and.; the
ordering of rods by length (e.g., if when placed side by
point rod y does not extend past rod x, thenx(0 y).
'../




side from the same
Let +, be the
/"'-.,
means that x and y laid end to end are equivalent, in the ordering -( .:: .> '
to a rod z. The triple (y,;;1,/:--> ) is an e.r.s. An obviousn,:'r.s.
1 1 'y' "'/
is (R+,.::,+) where R+ is the set of positive reals, .::is their usual ordering,
and + is their usual addition. (But this is not the only possible n.r.s,
for measuring the e.r.s. Numerical multiplication, for instance, rather
than addition could model the empirical operation ~.) A length scale
1 is then a function ¢ from Y to R such that, for all, X,YEY,
1 ¢(x)ER+
(ii) ¢(x).:: ¢(y) iff x0 y
(iii) ¢(x,I:) y) = ¢(x) + ¢(y) .
.'......."...../15
The practice of measurement ends with the construction of a
suitable scale. The theory of measurement continues by considering the
uniqueness of the suitable scales. Measurement scales are rarely unique.
In the first place, there normally exist many homomorphisms from the
e.r.s. to a given n.r.s. Thus in the preceding example, every function
¢I such that ¢'(x) = ~¢(x) for some positive real ~, is also a homomorphism.
The choice of one of these homomorphisms, or scales, is arbitrary, i.e.,
it is not determined by the e.r.s. In the second place, there normally
exist many suitable n.r.sls. Thus, if • represents numerical multiplication
then (R~, ~ , .) is an alternative n.r.s. for measuring length. Since the
choice of an.r.s. is arbitrary, the theory of measurement must determine
how the numbers assigned to empirical elements change with a different
arbitrary choice of n.r.s. as well as with a different arbitrary choice
of a homomorphism into a given n.r.s.* These strictly technical matters,
though far from easy, are less interesting than the discovery of the
axioms that characterize the e.r.s. sufficiently to permit its measure-
ment in the first place, but they are essential to the use of the numbers.
In particular, any relations between the numbers, or between the numbers
that result from them by further calculation, are meaningful (well defined)
only if they are invariant to all arbitrary choices. In the case of such
invariance, the numerical relations simply model the underlying empirical
relations; in any other case, where the numerical relations are not
*The preceding description, based on Krantz, et. al. (1971),
applies to what is called fundamental or primary measurement. For a
theory of derived or secondary measurement see Osborne (1976a).16
invariant, they have no empirical significance: they are properties of
nUlllbers as nUlllbers not as measurements. It is evideni: that strictly
nUlllerical relations cannot createempirical relations. Measurement
models but does not create empirical relations.
If we measured the lengths and weights of steel rods we'd get
two sets of nUlllbers related in many ways. But a relation such as
¢(x) > 'l'(y),
where ¢(x) is a length measure and 'l'(y) is a weight measure, obviously
depends on our choiceof length and weight scales and could be reversed
by a different choice: it is strictly nUlllerical. No one would suppose
that this relation between measurements implied a comparison of length
with weight. And if someone did believe the length of rod x to be
greater than the weight of rod y, he would not justify it with the
measurements but with the rods themselves. He could justify it with the
measurements only if it were invariant to all the arbitrary choices that
produced them.
A comparison between measurements is meaningful only as a con-
venient substitute for a comparison between the empirical elements. The
possibility of this empirical comparison must exist, at least in principle,
before the measurements are made. Measurement reproduces but does not
produce meaningful comparisons. This is trivially obvious in the familiar
contexts of length and weight measurement but is no less true in the more
mysterious contexts of utility measurement.17
It is true that we orten compare measurements when the Wlderlying
empirical comparisons are physically impossible. We can't rearrange Bentham's
birth or death to coincide with Sidgwick's; yet, we are sure that Bentham
lived a longer life. We can't place Dublin and Odessa on the
same line segment from Paris; yet measurements show us that Paris is
closer to Dublin than to Odessa.* But thOUgh we cannot make these
empirical comparisons directly, we could, if we cared to, make them
indirectly via some third element of the set in question by using
the transitivity of the associated empirical ordering. Indeed, if we
did not believe this to be so we would not regard the time intervals
corresponding to the ages, or the lengths corresponding to the distances,
as belonging to the same e.r.s.; in this case we would not regard the
ages or the distances as being comparable.**
*Actual measurements aren't necessary. Every Texan knows that
Paris is in the eastern part of his state while Dublin is near the center
and Odessa is in the far west.
**We use quite a bit of theory in imagining these indirect
empirical comparisons: for example, that a steel rod does not change
when we move it about while ascertaining how many copies of it separate
Paris and Dublin. Indirect empirical comparisons--and therefore measure-
ments--presuppose theory. Hence operationalism, the doctrine that all
scientific knowledge ultimately rests on the operations that yield
numerical measurements, is Wltenable. See Popper (1962, pp. 59-65) for
a fine discussion.18
As applied to our question, the above considerations show that
no method of interpersonal comparisons can rest essentially on utility
measurement. Every comparis.on made with the aid of utility measurement
must be possible without that aid or it is artificial. I will try to
'---'---
Since "increasing transformation of" is an
amplify this statement by detailed consideration of two confusions. Though
for brevity I speak only in terms of preference, or a person's utility as
understood by himself, my argument meets the case where utility is something
to be understood by a paternalistic observer. The cases differ only in the
source of the orderings (";:";. andr:I.: individual i or the paternalist.
~' ~ L..::...J ~ -
7. The Ordinal/Cardinal Confusion
The empirical relational structure (e.r.s.) for individual i's ordinal
utility is (X-, Y, .) and the natural numerical relational structure (n.r.s.)
'c/l.
for measuring his utility is (Rl , ». An ordinal utility scale for i is
a:n:y function f . from X to Rl such that, for all x,y"X,
~
All such functions constitute a class F., the members of which are increasing
~
transformations of each other.* To every possible preference ordering !~i
''J
(which we assume to be complete and transitive) there corresponds a class
F. of ordinal utility scales.
~
equivalence relation on the set of maps from X to Rl , the class F. is an
~
equivalence class.
Individuals 1 and 2 have identical preferences iff their order-
ings@ 1 and@2 agree everywhere on X; in that case Fl = F2; in every
*We assume the conditions sufficient for the existence of f ..
~
See Krantz, et. al. (1971).19
other case Fl and F2 are disjoint. In other words, the preferences of 1
and 2 can be measured on the same ordinal utility scale if and only if
they are identical.
Now suppose we defined the relation (ordinal interpersonal com-
parison)@ by:
(l,X)(~ (2,y) iff fl(X) > f2(y).
Then if the preferences differ, so that Fl f F2, the relation is ill defined:
the preceding expression is not invariant to substitutions in equivalence
classes, for F
l
contains an fi such that fi(x) < f2(y) even though fl(X)
exceeds f2(y).
If on the other hand the preferences agree, so that Fl = F2,
an ordinal interpersonal comparison still does not follow. Reverting to
the steel rods of section 6, suppose their diameters and density to be con-
stant. Then weight is proportional to length and every length scale is also
a weight scale, i.e., both types of scale belong to the same equivalence
class. (One scale is a positive linear transformation of the other, and
this is an equiValence relation in the class of real-valued functions on
the set of rods). But from this supposition we cannot conclude that
length and weight are comparable., and indeed we know better. The mere
equality of Fl and F2 does not, therefore, justify an ordinal interpersonal
comparison. Anyway (not to waste words on it), the equality would remove
all motives for the comparison: There would be no interpersonal conflicts
to resolve by appeal to the social utility.In that case G l
= G2; in every other
20
We thus reach the widely accepted conclusion that ordinal utility
measurement offers no help with interpersonal comparisons. The conclusion
is the same, though not so widely accepted*, in the case of cardinal utility.
The e.r.s. for intensive preferences is very rich, containing,
besides the ordering(:;'\ ., the set ;f of pairs of states such that
Q~ ~
(x,y)e;X~ iff x,l;:). y and the orderingn. on X~. Under certain
~ '~ ~ L.::-J ~ ~
conditions (for which see Krantz, et. al., 1971) there is a map g.
~
1 from X to R such that, for all w,X,y,ZE X,
g.(w) > g.(y) iff w(;\. Y
1 - l 1.0
1
gi(W) - g. (x) > g. (y) - gi(Z) iff (w,x)r:l. (y,z).
1. - 1. L::J 1.
The e.r.s. determines this map up to a positive affine transformation
Clg. (x) + S, CI>O. The map g. is an interval ("cardinal") utility scale
~ ~
for i and the class G. ={Clg.(x) + SICl>O, xeX} is the equivalence class
~ ~
of such scales.**
IndiViduals 1 and 2 have identical intensive preferences whenever
G\ =(;\ andQ ='jr---;' . '-,1 ,:::"12 ; - 1 -,2
\~ ~ t__,
case, G l and G2 are disjoint.
The frequent references to cardinal utility in connection with
interpersonal comparisons must reflect the belief that cardinal utility is
(a) sufficient, or (b) necessary for the comparisons, as if the richer
*Indeed, many people justify their denial of interpersonal com-
parisons by citing their disbelief in cardinal utility or vice versa, as
if they had to swallow the one with the other.
**The relation, "positive affine transformation Of," is an
equivalence relation in the set of real-valued functions on X.And if the intensive
of interpersonal comparisons
21
individual e.r.s. 's (a) undoubtedly supplied, or (b) could alone supply,
the material needed for the comparisons.
(a) It is obvious, however, that the mere individual orderings
~2 /~ !.::. . on r. imply nothing about the interpersonal orderings, ( > ) on S or
L__ i l 1. -,~ _
~ on T, beyond the requirements of Axiom 2. Suppose, then, that: >
L.:.J L-i
for instance, is defined in terms of utility numbers:
(l,w,x)i > : (2,y,z) iff gl(w) - gl(x) > g2(y) - g2(z).
1----
But clearly, this relation is ill defined if individuals 1 and 2 have
different intensive preferences, for substitutions within the disjoint
equivalence classes G l and G2 can convert > to ~
preferences are identical, then no interpersonal comparisons are needed.
(This case of identical intensive preferences is so trivial and, with
respect to any real problem of social choice, so vacuous, that we will
hen~eforth ignore it.)
(b) Now necessity, if it were true, would imply the sufficiency
for cardinal utility. But supposing the
existence of~". or[ .::. !' we obtain at most the e.r.s. 's (X,G) i'
X~,r;:l .), ~this only because of Axiom 2; we do not obtain the con-
~ L:J~
ditions on these structures that make them measurable on an interval scale.
It is of course possible that such additional axioms as are required to
obtain I.::. IWOuld condition the individual e.r.s. I s sufficiently for their
interval measurement. But this possibility, which has never been explored,
is not an implication. At the moment, therefore, we have no reason to
believe interpersonal comparisons sufficient for interval utility nor,
a fortiori, interval utility necessary for interpersonal comparisons.22
It thus appears that neither ordinal nor interval utility bear
any relation to interpersonal comparisons. With respect to these com-
parisons, there is no difference between the two types of utility.
8. The Units/Origins Confusion
It is often said that an interpersonal comparison is a matter
of common utility units, as if the existence of a common unit for the
utilities of two persons were sufficient, or necessary, for the comparison.
But this is a simple misconception--and not just because measurement, and
hence in particular the choice of units, normally follows empirical
comparisons.
Confining attention to interval measurement, the usual context
of the discussion, suppose the intensive preferences are thus measurable.
To construct an interval utility scale for person i is to assign numbers
to the states in a manner that preserves his intensive preferences. One
such number is completely arbitrary; we have to choose some state x and
then choose some number g.(x) for it. Then we have to choose some other
1
state y that is not indifferent to x and assign some number g.(y) to it,
1
SUbject only to the requirement that g.(y) > g.(x) iff xr;:'). y. These
1 1 \....../1
choices determine the numbers g.(w) to be assigned to all other states w.
1
Now in the first place, g.(x) and g.(y) need not be 1 and 0;
1 1
they are any two numbers that preserve i's preference between x and y.
Furthermore, they need not imply the assignment of 0 or 1 to any state;
,/~"-
if x is supremal in X under! >, ., g.(x) might be -30. Suppose, however,
"-.7' 1 1
that we choose x as unit and y as origin for person 1:gl(x) =1,
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gl(y) =0.
In the second place, the numbers arbitrarily chosen for person
1, which determine his entire utility scale, determine nothing about
person 2's scale. The choice of l's numbers could restrict the choice of
2's only if the two e.r.s. 's were parts of a larger e.r.s., the relations
of which our measurements are to preserve. But then such relations would
precede the measurement, not follow from it. Failing such relations,
that is, given individual utility measurement alone, we can neither
justify nor object to the assignment of l's unit and origin to 2. If
2 prefers x to y we can put g2(x) =1 and g2(y) =0 if we want to.
Nothing in the problem forbids it. Equally, nothing requires it.
Moreover, except in the trivial and vacuous case of identical
intensive preferences*, the assignment of common units or common origins,
or both, implies no further relations between the scales. Obviously,
such an assignment does not entail a common scale for 1 and 2 when Gl
~ G2;
for in that caSe no common scale exists.
That persons 1 and 2 have the same utility unit, or different
utility units, means only that we have chosen that way. The position would
be very peculiar, if an interpersonal comparison were meaningful if (or only
*Which does not, of course, imply an interval interpersonal com-
parison any more than identical preferences imply an ordinal interpersonal
comparison.•
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if) we chose a common unit but meaningless if we chose differently, when
the choice rides on nothing but our whim. Exactly the same is true of
common, or as it may be, different, utility origins.*
Sen (1970) has brought further confusion to the subject with
his notion, unfortunately taken up by D'Aspremont and Gevers (1977) among
others, that between the case of common units and common origins, assertedly
permitting !)Qd interpersonal comparisons, and the case of different units
and different origins, assertedly permitting E£ such compariesons, lie intermediate
cases of common units but different origins, or vice versa, which according to
him permit partial interpersonal comparisons. But the distinction between these
four cases is utterly inconsequential. We can give persons 1 and 2 common units but
different origins, or the reverse, or neither, at will; and as long as
their preferences agree on some pair of states we can give them common
units and common origins if we want.**
In short, units and origins have no bearing on the question of
interpersonal comparisons. They have seemed important only because of a
simple confusion.
*And, of course, we can always restrict each scale to the same
range, say [O,lJ. Then, if both persons regard the same state x as
minimal and the same state y as maximal, their scales will agree at the
extremes; but no interpersonal comparison follows.
**Sen and D'Aspremont and Gevers write as if the cases, (i) g2(x) :
Clgl (x), Vx (Cl>O), and (U) g2(x) = gl(x) + 8, Vx, were different. Clearly




, whence individuals 1 and 2 have identical intensive preferences.•
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9. Proper and Improper Analogies
Our confusions rest, I believe, on the words in which we talk
about utility, words that suggest implicit analogies to other fields of
measurement. We talk about the "utility of Jones" in the same way we
talk about his age or his temperature, and this leads us to think of
his utility scale as measuring a property of himself, just as the time
and temperature scales do. We are then apt to consider a pair (gl' g2)
of utility scales as analogous, for instance, to Fahrenheidt and Celsius
scales. These temperature scales are certainly different but we know
their readings are comparable because they measure the same thing. They
assign different temperature numbers to a person but they belong to the
same equivalence class. Though we do not describe the matter in terms
of equivalence classes, our experience with the word "temperature" leads
us to conclude, correctly, that the Fahrenheidt and Celcius scales
measure the same thing--that Jones's and Smith's temperatures are com-
parable even if measured on different scales. By implicit analogy, we
falsely conclude from the word "utility" applied to gl and g2 that they,
too, measure the same thing.
Or we might think gl and g2 analogous to a pair of thermometers
that only have to be calibrated at two points in order to measure all
temperatures on the same scale, thus falsely concluding that gl and g2
need (or only need) a similar calibration (say at I and 0) to make "the
utility of Jones" comparable to Smith's.•
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Our usage, "the utility of Jones" and "the utility of Smith,"
leads us unconsciously to think of the men as members of the set being
measured, as they are when we speak of their temperature. But in utility
measurement, the men do not belong to this set; they measure the set.
Properly speaking, we deal not with the utilities of the men but with the
utilities of states to them. A person's utility scale measures not a property
of himself but a property of the set of states. It is true that any dif-
ference in intensive preferences rests ultimately on differences in the
persons, which we might call a difference in their properties. But
utility scales do not measure this difference, as a temperature scale
measures a difference in their temperature; they merely signal its existence.
If we need an analogy, a better one is between (gl' g2) and,
for instance, the pair (~,1) of temperature and intelligence scales (the
latter assumed for the sake of argument to be an interval scale). The
source of the analogy is that each pair happens to be defined on a single
set, (gl' g2) on X and (~,1)on a set of people. Since we would never think
the assignment of zero intelligence and temperature to Jones and unit
intelligence and temperature to Smith gives us a comparison of intelligence
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